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INTRODUCTION

In Jones v. United States,3 an engineer on a vessel was
making his rounds as duty officer when he fell in the emergency
diesel generator room. He did not see what caused him to slip
and fall. He did not notice any grease on his shoes or pants when

1. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
2. LSU Interim President, Dodson and Hooks Endowed Chair and
Maritime Law and James Huntington and Patricia Kleinpeter Odom Professor
of Law. This Article was presented as a lecture as part of the Davis Lecture
Series of the Federal Bar Association-Lafayette and Acadiana Region. The
lecture honors Judge W. Eugene Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Judge Davis is a wonderful judge; to someone in my field,
Admiralty, he is a paragon. He is one of the nation's great maritime jurists and
has justifiably joined the ranks of the great Fifth Circuit Admiralty judges:
John Minor Wisdom, John Brown, Alvin Rubin, John Duhe, and more.

3. 936 F.3d 318. 320 (5th Cir. 2019).
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he fell. Plaintiff later sued for negligence under the Jones Act
and for unseaworthiness.4 He testified in his deposition that he
thought he fell on grease. 5 He claimed that the vessel had cables
above the weather decks; the crew frequently greased the cables,
and the grease would drip onto the decks.6 While there was an
overhang above the entrance to the generator room, plaintiff
claimed grease could be tracked or spread across the deck.] The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed and said: "The Jones Act causation
standard is lower than at common law. But it still requires some
evidence."8 Grease in places on the ship's deck at various times
was not sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that
grease on the deck caused the plaintiff's fall.9
So, what is the source of this lower causation standard in
Jones Act cases to which the court referred? The Jones Actio
grants a seaman a negligence action against the employer. The
Jones Act, by its terms, incorporates the substantive standards of

the

Federal

Employers

Liability

Act

(FELA),ii

which

is

applicable to interstate and international railroad workers. And
the FELA provides that a railroad is liable to its employees for
personal injury damages or wrongful death "resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence" of the railroad.12
Thus, whenever an employer's negligence causes "in whole or
in part" injury or death to a seaman, the FELA imposes
liability.13 Since the Jones Act incorporates the substantive
standards of the FELA, judicial interpretations of the meaning of
FELA provisions apply in Jones Act cases. 14 Thus, the "in whole

4. Id. (He also sought maintenance and a cure).

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 320.
9. Id. at 322.
10. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ("Laws of the United States regulating
recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an
action under this section.").

11. Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 570 (1994).
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or in part"15 FELA language applies in Jones Act cases. And, the
United States Supreme Court has provided some intriguing gloss
on the phrase "in whole or in part."16 That is the subject of this
Article.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FELA
phrase "in whole or in part" several times, most recently in CSX
TransportationInc. v. McBride.17 Its jurisprudence on the subject
is confusing, unclear, and inconsistent with mainstream tort law.
In McBride, the Court held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to give a jury instruction that required the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant proximately caused the plaintiffs
injuries.18 A proper instruction, per the majority, would be to tell
the jury it should find for the plaintiff on causation if the
defendant's negligence played a part in causing the plaintiffs
injuries19. In so holding, the Court did not separate the cause
inquiry into its two basic, constituent parts: cause-in-fact and
scope of risk or liability-what the law used to and sometimes
does still calls "proximate or legal cause."20 The former-causein-fact-is sometimes called factual cause. 21 An act is a factual
cause of an injury if the factfinder concludes that the injury
would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's particular
alleged negligent act. 22 Scope of the risk or liability (what courts
used to and often do still call proximate or legal cause) is a
limitation on the supposed infinite liability that might result if
factual cause were all that the law required.23 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 provides
that: "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result
from the risks that made the actor's conduct negligent."24 The

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

45 U.S.C. § 51.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 570.
See generally 564 U.S. 685 (2011).
Id. at 2634.
Id. at 2635.
Id. at 2336.

21. DAN DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d ed. 2020).

22. Id.

23. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV.
293, 294 (2002).
24. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29

(2010).
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Restatement (Third) does not use the phrases proximate or legal
cause. 2 5 While the Court did not expressly adopt a proximate
cause or scope of risk requirement in McBride, it clearly
contemplated some limit on liability for "far out 'but for'
scenarios."26 The Court just did not explain itself very clearly.
The United States Supreme Court's lumping together of
cause-in-fact and scope of risk in one supposed causation inquiry
blurs two important concepts and, in doing so, repeats an error
that was common before the ground-breaking work of Leon
Green and other legal realists.27 Moreover, it has led to continued
confusion and a concomitant lack of meaningful analysis on each
part of the so-called causation requirement. Herein, I will
endeavor to explain the source of the confusion, urge the Court to
bifurcate the cause-in-fact issue from the scope of risk issue, and
humbly suggest a broad reading of scope of risk in FELA and
Jones Act cases given the statutory purposes and the
jurisprudential history.
Happily, McBride does not use the phrases "proximate cause"
or "legal cause."28 Jettisoning those terms from the analysis is
progress, real progress. Proximate cause leant an air of mystery
to the law of negligence; more aptly, in enshrouded it in a fog of
confusion. The phrase disguised the common-sense notion that
liability was not unlimited, the notion that some risks were
beyond the scope of risks that made the actor negligent in the
first place. It made the limitation decision look like a legal
decision, rather than a fact specific decision based essentially on
fairness and the experience of the community. The tests courts
used were confusing- foreseeability, hindsight, direct, remote,
natural and probable, intervening and superseding causesconfused; they did not clarify. The Court has wisely abandoned
the charade, although, as noted, it has not clearly said what
replaces them.
In Section II, I will analyze Rogers v. Missouri Pacific

25. Id.
26. McBride, 564 U.S at 704.
27. See generally LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 186-95 (1930); LEON
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE Cause 76-77 (1927).
28. See generally McBride, 564 U.S. at 685.
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Railroad Co.,29 one of the fountainheads of the current muddle.
Section III will discuss subsequent twentieth century FELA
causation jurisprudence. Section IV will set forth the questions
that the early jurisprudence left unanswered; Section V, takes a
very relevant aside to violation of statute negligence cases under
FELA and the Jones Act. Section VI analyzes Norfolk Southern
Ry. Co. v. Sorrell30 and Section VII discusses McBride. Section
VIII summarizes the critical, scholarly commentary after
McBride, much of which I relied upon in forming my views.
Section IX samples the post-McBride jurisprudence. Section X
sets forth my own analysis and consideration of the issues. And
Section XI provides a brief conclusion.

II.

ROGERS

In Rogers an FELA case, a railroad worker was ordered to
use a hand torch to burn weeds and vegetation off a slope
adjacent to defendant's rail lines.31 The supervisor instructed the
worker to move off the tracks when a train passed and to watch
for any hotboxes on the passing train.32 The reason for the order
to get away from the tracks when a train approached was that
the sound of one passing train could mute the sound of another
approaching train, thereby placing the worker at risk.33 As a
train approached, plaintiff got off the tracks and watched for
hotboxes.34 But as he did so, the passing train fanned the fire
which was burning in the weeds.35 The fire approached the
plaintiff who, when he moved away, stumbled, and fell into a
culvert, suffering injury.36 The worker sued the employer.37
The trial court instructed the jury to find for the defendant if
the plaintiff employee was "the sole cause of his mishap."38 The
29. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
30. 549 U.S. 158 (2007).
31. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 501-03.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

36. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 501-03 (1957).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 504.
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jury found for the plaintiff.39 The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed,40 concluding, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, that
the plaintiff was the sole cause of his injury.41 The United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, reversed the
Missouri Supreme Court, and reinstated the jury verdict.42 In
doing so, Justice Brennan said:
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the
proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing
the injury or death for which damages are sought. 43

The Court continued:
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry
whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury
or death.44

In reinstating the jury verdict, the Court first noted that the
jury had apparently decided that the plaintiff was not the sole
cause of his injuries and that the defendant's negligence had
played a part in causing the plaintiffs injuries and that there
was evidence to support those conclusions.45
Justice Brennan also noted that the Missouri Supreme Court
opinion could be read to say that the plaintiffs alleged negligence
was at least as probable a cause for his injury as the defendant's
fault and, if that were the case, there was no issue for the jury.46

39. Id. at 505.
40. Id. at 503-05; 352 U.S. at 524 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Justice Frankfurter dissented in Rogers and three other cases, arguing that the
Court should not decide FELA sufficiency of the evidence cases).

41. Id.; Michael D. Green, The FederalEmployers Liability Act: Sense and
Nonsense About Causation, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 504 (2012) (Professor
Michael Green points out that actually the Missouri Supreme Court found that
there was no negligence of the railroad and that the state court did not use the
sole cause phrase).

42. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 511 (1957).
43. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).

44. Rogers, 352 U.S at 506-07 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 505.
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But the Court noted that the FELA does not require the plaintiff
to exclude a "conclusion favorable [for] the defendant."47
Justice Brennan continued:
The Missouri court's opinion implies its view that this is the
governing standard by saying that the proofs must show that
'the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence' of
his employer, and that '[t]he test of whether there is a causal
connection is that, absent the negligent act the injury would
not have occurred.' That is language of proximate causation
which makes a jury question dependent upon whether the jury
may find that the defendant's negligence was the sole, efficient,
producing cause of injury.48

Of course, torts aficionados will see that Justice Brennan
merges or conflates two related, but different, concepts: cause-infact and proximate cause. "But for" is the test for cause-in-fact,
not proximate cause. And the phrase "sole . . . cause" was often
used in deciding the proximate cause issue. Thus, but for is
cause-in-fact and sole cause is proximate cause and Justice
Brennan essentially ran them together.49 His mistake may
perhaps be forgiven because, first, FELA does not expressly
separate the two concepts and, second, in the early part of the
twentieth century, courts often confused or mingled the two
concepts. 50 I will have much more to say about this later because
Justice Brennan's conflation of cause-in-fact and proximate
cause, or what we might more appropriately call scope of
liability, continues to haunt us today in FELA/Jones Act cases.

III.

GALLICK

After Rogers, the Court decided Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co.51 There, defendant railroad had allowed a fetid pool

47. Id. at 506.

48. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
49. Id. at 500.
50. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Let the Jury Decide!A Pleafor the
ProperAllocation of Decision-MakingAuthority in Louisiana Negligence Cases,
94 TUL. L. REV. 769, 778 (2020).
51. 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
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of stagnant water to remain on its property. 52 The pool contained
the bodies and body parts of rats and pigeons; moreover, insects
were present on and around the pool.53 While working around the
pool, a large bug bit plaintiff on the leg.54 The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice White, described what ensued:
The wound subsequently became infected. The infection failed
to respond to medical treatment, and worsened progressively
until it spread throughout petitioner's body, creating pusforming lesions and eventually necessitating the amputation of
both his legs. None of the doctors who treated and studied
petitioner's case could explain the etiology of his present
condition, although some of them diagnosed or characterized it
as 'pyoderma gangrenosum, secondary to insect bite.'55

The plaintiff sued in Ohio state court; the jury answered a
series of special interrogatories.56 Based on the answers to those
questions, the court found for the plaintiff.57 The Ohio Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that there was no "'direct evidence that
the existence of the unidentified bug at the time and place had
any connection with the stagnant and infested pool,' or had
become infected by the pool with the substance that caused
petitioner's infection;" the bug could just as likely come from a
nearby river or surrounding weeds.58 The Court of Appeals
thought that there was, at best, a "chain of causation" that was
speculative and too tenuous to establish liability.59 The Ohio
Supreme Court declined to review the decision.60
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice White
said:
According to the Court of Appeals, the break in the causal
chain that turned it into a mere 'series of guesses and
speculations' was the want of evidence from which the jury

52. Id. at 109.
53. Id.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 109-10.
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 110 (1963).
Id. at 112.
Id.
59. Id. at 113.
60. Id.

260

"Even the Slightest"

2021]

could properly conclude that respondent's fetid pool had had
something to do with the insect that bit petitioner. The only
question was whether or not the insect was from or had been
attracted by the pool. We hold that the record shows sufficient
evidence to warrant the jury's conclusion that petitioner's
injuries were caused by the acts or omissions of respondent. 61

Direct evidence or more substantial circumstantial evidence
was not required.62 The maintenance of the fetid pool had
something to do with the insect that bit petitioner.63

Additionally, in Crane v. Cedar Rapids & L C. Ry.,64 the
Court, in dicta, said that under the FELA a plaintiff "is not
required to prove common-law proximate causation but only that
his injury resulted 'in whole or in part' from the railroad's
violation of the Act."65

IV.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Rogers with its "even the slightest"66 causation language, and

61. Id.

62. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 114 (1963).
63. Id.

64. 395 U.S. 164 (1969).
65. Id. at 166.
66. While not the subject of this lecture, the even the slightest language
caused other problems. Courts began to export the concept from the causation
element(s) to the standard of care element and to only require that the plaintiff
establish the defendant's slight negligence. Then the slight negligence of the
defendant moved across the "v." to the plaintiffs side and the plaintiff's duty of
care to him or herself became a duty of slight care, rather than ordinary care.
The Fifth Circuit cleared up this confusion in Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine,

Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997). There, in an opinion by Judge Duhe, the
court made clear that the standard of care was ordinary care and that standard
applied to both the defendant and the plaintiff. Interestingly, in Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957), decided the same day as
Rogers, plaintiff was a second baker on ship. He was ordered to prepare twelve
servings of ice cream. The ice cream was very frozen so (very frozen?), at some
point in the operation, he could not extricate the ice cream from the container.
Absent the availability of an ice chipper, the second baker decided to use a
sharp butcher knife to loosen the ice cream. Sadly, during the process, his hand
slipped, resulting in the loss of two fingers on his right hand. He filed suit
under the Jones Act and the U.S. Supreme Court said he had established
sufficient evidence that the risk which occurred was foreseeable and that his
employer was conceivably negligent because the event was foreseeable. In so
holding, the Court cited and quoted Rogers. It is not altogether clear if it was
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cases like Gallick, left some unanswered questions because there
were various ways to interpret the decisions. For instance:
1. Was the relaxed causation standard limited to cases
where the plaintiff was alleged to be at fault? That is, was it
nothing more than a clear reminder that under the FELA,67 the
plaintiff's negligence would reduce, not bar, recovery.6 8 Gallick
would seem to belie this interpretation.
2. Was Rogers and its language simply a condemnation of
the tendency of some courts to refer to the "sole" cause of an
accident?
3. Did Rogers mean that the FELA relaxed the proof needed
on causation? It would seem so but then on which part of
"causation?" Cause-in-fact? Proximate cause? Or, both?
4. Or did Rogers not just relax the causation standard, did it
eliminate the need to prove proximate cause at all in FEELA and
Jones Act cases? That was the import of the Crane dictum.
Clear answers to these questions were not forthcoming.
Several post-Rogers lower courts noted that the burden of proof
on causation in an FELA case was lower than in a negligence

case at common law.69 Consistently, the U.S. Supreme Court in
ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. Gottshall,70 referred, in dictum, to the
relaxed standard of causation in FELA cases but said no more on
that issue. But relaxed on cause-in-fact? Relaxed on proximate
cause? And what was the standard or standards?
Arguably going further, in Oglesby v. Southern Pacific
Transp. Co.,71 the court said that "common law 'proximate cause'
is not required under the FELA." In Summers v. Missouri Pacific
R.R. System,72 the court expressly noted that some courts had
held that it would be error to include an instruction on proximate
cause in an FELA case. As authority, the court cited a leading

citing it in reference to breach or causation.

67. 45 U.S.C. § 53.
68. See generally 45 U.S.C. § 54 (In addition, under the 1939 amendments
to the FELA, assumption of the risk was not a defense).

69. See Holbrook v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 414 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2005);
Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1999).
70. Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
71. 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993).
72. 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997).
262
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Fifth Circuit decision, Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry.,73 wherein the
court said that the definite departure from traditional commonlaw tests of proximate causation as applied to the [FELA] came
in Rogers." In Page, the court held it was error to instruct the
jury that it must find defendant was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury.74 The court said:
Under the definition of proximate cause in this case, the jury
was required to find, before the plaintiff could prevail, that the
cause of his injury was one which in natural and continuous
sequence [common law proximate cause] produced the event or
happening in question and without which such event or
happening would not have occurred [cause-in-fact]. A detailed
consideration of those requirements would seem to indicate
that they are not essential to the jury's conclusion in this case
that employer negligence played a part in producing the
plaintiff's injury. The same thing would appear to be true of
the requirement that the accident be the natural and probable

consequence [proximate cause] of defendant's act or omission
and such a consequence as ought to have been foreseen
[proximate cause or breach] by a person in the exercise of
ordinary care in the light of attending circumstances. Those
requirements may well have been injurious to the plaintiff.
They are foreign to the simple test prescribed in Rogers, supra.
Under that decision, and the long line of Supreme Court cases
which have followed it, we must hold that the court's
instructions on proximate causation were erroneous in
operating to unduly restrict the jury in the exercise of its
functions. 7 5

Thus, some courts simply stated that the burden of proof on
causation under the FELA and the Jones Act was relaxed. Others
arguably went further stating that it was error to instruct a jury
in an FELA and Jones Act case that the defendant was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Did that mean that
there was no proximate cause or scope of liability requirement in
FELA and Jones Act cases? What has the Supreme Court said
more recently?

73. 312 F.2d 84, 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1963).
74. Id. at 92.

75. Id.
263
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AN ASIDE ON VIOLATION OF STATUTE
NEGLIGENCE CASES

Before turning to the post-2000 FELA/Jones Act Supreme
Court causation jurisprudence, an aside to a closely related legal
issue is necessary. In a negligence case when a plaintiff alleges
that the defendant's violation of a statute constitutes a violation
of the appropriate standard of care (sometimes loosely referred to
as negligence per se cases), the court must answer two questions
in determining whether the plaintiff may rely upon the statute as
the standard of care of a reasonable person or as evidence of the
standard of care of a reasonable person. 76 Those two questions
are: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class of persons
which the statute was enacted to protect and (2) whether the risk
(or type of accident) which arose was a risk which the statute was
enacted to guard or protect against.77 The second question is
essentially a scope of the risk or scope of liability question, i.e., it
is an old school proximate cause question.78 That point is critical
because of the way in which the United States Supreme Court
has analyzed violation of statute in FELA and Jones Act cases.
In a number of decisions, involving violations of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act,79 and the Boiler Inspection Act,80 the Court
has held that any defect which constitutes a violation of those
acts is actionable under the FELA if the violation contributed to
the injury "without regard to whether the injury flowing from the
breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent."81
On the Jones Act side of the ledger, in Kernan v. American
Dredging Company82 the plaintiff seaman was killed when the
tug on which he worked caught fire while towing a scow. The

76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§

14

(2010).
77. Id.

78. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primeron the Patternsof Negligence, 53 LA.
L. REV. 1509, 1517-18 (1993).
79. 45 U.S.CA. § 2 (2020).
80. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (2020).
81. See Coray v. S. Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949); Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163 (1949); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66
(1917); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917).
82. 355 U.S. 426. 427-28 (1958).
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seaman's survivors alleged that the fire was caused because an
open-flame kerosene lamp on the scow's deck ignited very
flammable vapors lying above petroleum products which had
accumulated on the water's surface.83 The lamp in question was
less than three feet above the water. 84 A regulation required that
lights must be at least eight feet above the water. 85 Plaintiffs
alleged that the violation of the regulation rendered the
defendant negligent.86 Defendant countered that the purpose of
the height requirement was to make the lamp visible to other
vessels in order to avoid a collision.87 That is, defendant
contended that the regulation was not intended to protect against
the risk that a low hanging lamp would cause a fire.88 The
district court held that the lamp was a cause-in-fact of the death
but that the regulation was not intended to protect against the
risk which occurred and thus there was no liability.89 The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, with Justice Brennan writing
for the majority, reversed, relying on the FELA Federal Safety
Appliance Act and Boiler Inspection Act cases referenced above
and said:
The courts, in developing the FELA with a view to adjusting
equitably between the worker and his corporate employer the
risks inherent in the railroad industry, have plainly rejected
many of the refined distinctions necessary in common-law tort
doctrine for the purpose of allocating risks between persons
who are more nearly on an equal footing as to financial
capacity and ability to avoid the hazards involved. Among the
refinements developed by the common law for the purpose of
limiting the risk of liability arising from wrongful conduct is
the rule that violation of a statutory duty creates liability only
when the statute was intended to protect those in the position
of the plaintiff from the type of injury in fact incurred. This
limiting approach has long been discarded from the FELA.

83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 427-28 (1958).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Instead, the theory of the FELA is that where the employer's
conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by this
Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability
ensues. And this result follows whether the fault is a violation
of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with
care, for the employer owes the employee, as much as the duty
of acting with care, the duty of complying with his statutory

obligations. 90
Given that the scope of injury or risk issue is a proximate
cause issue masquerading in statutory interpretation clothes and
that the Supreme Court was willing to impose liability in
violation of statute cases where the risk which occurred was not
necessarily a risk the statute was enacted to guard against, then
perhaps proximate cause really is not requited in FELA and
Jones Act cases. But now let us turn to what the U.S. Supreme
Court itself said in recent years.

VI.

SORRELL

The United States Supreme Court returned to the
FELA/Jones Act causation issue in Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v.
Sorrell.91 In Sorrell, a railroad employee was driving a dump
truck loaded with supplies for use in some repairs on a gravel
road adjacent to the employer's railroad tracks.92 Plaintiff
claimed that a fellow employee negligently forced him off the
road into a ditch.93 The other driver claimed that plaintiff simply
drove off the road into the ditch.94 Relying on the fellow
employee's version of the events, the employer claimed that
either it was not liable at all or, at the very least, the plaintiff
was also negligent and, thus, any recovery should be reduced by
that negligence.95 The precise issue before the Court was whether
the standard of proof on causation was the same for both the

Id. at 438-39.
549 U.S. 158 (2007).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 160-61.
94. Id.
95. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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plaintiff and the defendant.96 Precisely, Missouri's pattern jury
instructions required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
negligence contributed "in whole or in part" to the plaintiffs
injury.97 Alternatively, the defendant, who alleged the plaintiff
was negligent, had to establish that the plaintiffs negligence
"directly contributed to cause the injury."98 The directly
contributed requirement is essentially a requirement that the
plaintiffs alleged negligent action was a proximate cause of the
accident.99
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed, arguing that the FELA required that the
same burden of proof on causation applied to both the plaintiff
and the defendant.100 The Court of Appeals affirmed because, per
the court, in Missouri where there is an approved instruction (as
there was here), the trial court must give it.1O1 The Missouri
Supreme Court refused discretionary review.102 Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
question of whether the same standard for causation applied to
both the plaintiff and the defendant.103 At the end of the day, the
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the same
standard of proof for causation applied to both the plaintiff and
the defendant.104
Noting that the Court, in interpreting the FELA is guided by
common-law principles, Chief Justice Roberts stated that at
common law the same standard of causation applied to both the
plaintiff and the defendant.105 He continued that it would be a
practical and a theoretical challenge to reduce the plaintiffs
damages "'in proportion' to the employee's negligence if the
relevance of each party's negligence to the injury [was] . .

96. Id.

97. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 160-61 (2007).
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 162 (2007).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 168.
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measured by a different standard of causation."106 Using the
same standard of causation would be comparing "apples to
apples."107 In so holding, the Court followed the Fifth Circuit and
cited Page.108
But what was the standard of causation in FELA and Jones
Act cases? That question engendered a good bit of discussion in
Sorrell, more, perhaps, than the issue on which the Court had
granted certiorari. The railroad argued that the Court should
consider not just whether the causation standard should be the
same for the plaintiff and defendant but also what the causation
standard was. 109 The railroad argued that the plaintiff should
have to prove that the defendant's negligence was a "proximate"
cause of the injury.110 It claimed that whatever Rogers did, it did
not eliminate the requirement that the defendant be a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.1 Sorrell argued that the Supreme
Court had departed from a "proximate" cause requirement in
Rogers and, in any event, the Court should not decide the issue
because it was not the question on which the Court had granted
certiorari and the defendant's arguments were inconsistent with
the position it had taken below.112 The Court agreed with Sorrell
on the procedural points: the Court had not granted certiorari on
the need to prove "proximate" cause and it would be unfair to
allow the railroad to switch gears (or tracks) and argue that
issue. 113

But
the
proximate
cause
question prompted
two
concurrences: one by Justice Souter, in which Justices Scalia and
Alito joined,114 and one by Justice Ginsburg.115 Justice Souter
agreed with the majority that the same causation standard

106. Id. at 169-70.
107. Id. at 169.
108. Id. at 164.

109. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 162 (2007).
110. Id. at 164.
111. Id.

112. Id. at 163-64.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).

115. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 177 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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should apply to the plaintiff and the defendant.116 And he agreed
that the Missouri Supreme Court should decide, in the first
instance, what that standard was. 117 He wrote to indicate that he
believed that Rogers did not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injures.118 Justice Souter pointed out that pre-Rogers
Supreme Court jurisprudence had referred to proximate cause. 119
According to Justice Souter, Rogers "merely instructed courts
how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable causes of an
injury."120 This was especially the case where the multiple causes
included the plaintiff's alleged fault.121 To require the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of
the injury would "undermine" the FELA's implementation of a
comparative fault regime.122 Justice Souter did admit that the
"even the slightest" language did not well serve clarity.123
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the same causation standard
applied to both the plaintiff and the defendant, but she clearly
disagreed with Justice Souter on the proximate cause
requirement.124 She noted that the FELA and Jones Act called for
a relaxed standard of causation.125 She approvingly cited and
quoted Rogers'"even the slightest" language.126
Continuing, Justice Ginsburg opined that, rather than
eliminating the proximate cause requirement in FELA cases,
"Rogers describes the test for proximate causation applicable in
FELA suits.127 That test is whether 'employer negligence played
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death[.]"'128 Then, citing Justice Andrews dissent in Palsgraf v.

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 174.

120. Id. at 173.
121. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 173 (2007).
122. Id. at 175.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 177-78.
125. Id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. Id.

127. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 178 (2007).
128. Id.
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Long Island R.R. Co.,129 Justice Ginsburg said that proximate
cause involves, in part, a policy judgment about "how far down
the chain of consequences a defendant should be responsible for
its wrongdoing."130 Justice Ginsburg turned to the FELA, as
Congress' expression of the relevant policy, and pointed out that
the FELA was enacted to protect railroad workers and that the
Supreme Court had liberally interpreted it to that end, including
the plaintiff getting to the jury if she or he proved that the
defendant's negligence "was even the slightest cause of his
injury."131 Justice Ginsburg then said: "The 'slightest' cause
sounds far less exacting than 'proximate cause,' which may
account for the statements in judicial opinion that Rogers
dispensed with proximate cause for FELA actions."132
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that scholars have long
criticized the confusion that the phrase proximate cause
engendered and that some had called for replacing "proximate
cause" with "legal cause."133 Thus, to Justice Ginsburg:
"[w]henever a railroad's negligence is the slightest cause of the
plaintiff's injury, it is a legal cause, for which the railroad is
properly held responsible."134 I will have more to say on scope of
the risk later. Per Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, the causation
jury instruction would provide that a party was the proximate
cause of an injury when the injury resulted in whole or in part
from the other party's negligence-i.e., such negligence payed
any part, even the slightest, in causing the injury.135
Thus, after Sorrell, we knew that the standard of causation
was the same for the defendant and the plaintiff. Alas, we still
did not know exactly what that standard of causation was. And
was the real issue cause-in-fact or scope of the risk (proximate
cause) or both?

129. 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
130. Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 178-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 179.
132. Id.

133. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 179-80 (2007).
134. Id. at 180.

135. Id. at 179. 181.
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VII.

MCBRIDE

The Supreme Court next considered the FELA/Jones Act
causation question in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride,136
McBride suffered serious injuries while switching (adding and
removing) cars on a train.137 McBride claimed that the employer
was negligent because the equipment employed-wide bodied
engines and an independent hand brake-was not safe for
switching and that the employer failed to train him on how to
properly use the equipment.138 The trial court gave a Seventh
Circuit pattern jury instruction on causation, which provided:
"Defendant 'caused or contributed to' Plaintiff's injury if
Defendant's negligence played a part-no matter how small-in
bringing about the injury. The mere fact that an injury occurred
does not necessarily mean that the injury was caused by
negligence."139
CSX, the employer, had requested an instruction requiring
the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's negligence was a
"proximate cause" of his injury, which it defined as: "any cause
which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury
complained of, with the qualification that a proximate cause need
not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause."140 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the jury also allocated the
plaintiff with one-third of the total fault141 CSX appealed
contending that if the requested instruction had been given a
jury might have concluded that "the chain of causation was too
indirect."142 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and, thereafter, CSX
successfully sought a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.143
A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed.144 Justice

136. 564 U.S. 685 (2011).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 690.

140. Id. at 689.
141. Id. at 690.

142. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 690 (2011).
143. Id. at 691.
144. Id. at 705.
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Ginsburg essentially turned her concurrence in the judgment in
Sorrell into the majority opinion-the so-called law of the land.
In the first paragraph of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
[W]e conclude that the Act [(the FELA)] does not incorporate
"proximate cause" standards developed in nonstatutory
common-law tort actions. The charge proper in FELA cases, we
hold, simply tracks the language
Congress employed,
informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or
contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's
negligence played any part in bringing about the injury.145

CSX had argued that Rogers and its "even the slightest"
language was intended to clearly show that contributory
negligence (plaintiff negligence) was not a bar to recovery in
FELA cases and that it was also aimed at other multiple cause
cases; i.e., to make clear that there can be multiple responsible
causes of an accident. The railroad claimed that Rogers was not
intended to eliminate a proximate cause requirement entirely.146
Justice Ginsburg rejected such a narrow reading of Rogers.
Reviewing the facts and language in Rogers, Justice Ginsburg
said that Rogers was best read as "a comprehensive of the FELA
causation standard,"147 and "a general standard for causation in
FELA cases, not one addressed exclusively to injuries involving
multiple potentially cognizable causes."148 Per Justice Ginsburg,
the result in Rogers was driven, in part, by prior judicial
recalcitrance to broadly interpret the FELA to foster its goal of
improving the plight of injured railroad workers.149 Moreover, she
noted that every circuit had rejected FELA jury instructions
using proximate cause language.150 Of course, that is not
necessarily a rejection of any scope of risk or liability
requirement.
In the third section of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg turned
to CSX's argument that proximate cause is a fundamental

145. Id. at 688.
146. Id. at 693.
147. Id. at 695.

148. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 696 (2011).
149. Id.

150. Id. at 698.
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concept in negligence actions. Without it, CSX argued, juries
would impose liability whenever the plaintiff established "but
for" causation.151 This is in essence a floodgates argument-the
Court's failure to require proximate cause in FELA and Jones Act
cases would open the floodgates of liability. Justice Ginsburg
brushed that argument aside saying that no one had pointed to
any absurd results in the history of FELA litigation.152 She then
reiterated her Sorrell statement that, rather than eliminating
proximate causation, Rogers described the FELA test for
proximate cause. 153 Here she used the statutory language-"in
whole or in part"-not the "even the slightest" language.154
Continuing in the next subsection of the opinion, which is not
the opinion of the Court because Justice Thomas did not join it,
Justice Ginsburg noted the confusion that the phrase "proximate
cause" and all its alternative variations has caused over the
years. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §29 entirely
eschewed the term proximate cause-a point to which I will
return in a later section.155
In the next subsection of the opinion, Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that to be held liable the defendant FELA employer
must be negligent. She said that reasonable foreseeability of
harm was an ingredient of FELA negligence because
foreseeability was directly relevant to whether or not the
defendant had behaved as a reasonable person under the
circumstances. That is, foreseeability was a relevant factor in
determining breach.
Then, critically, returning to causation, Justice Ginsburg said
judges and jurors can use their "common sense" when dealing
with far out "but for scenarios."156 Immediately thereafter, she
approvingly cited two cases: Nicholson v. Erie R. Co.157 and

151. Id. at 699.
152. Id.

153. Id. at 700.
154. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 702 (2011).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 703-04.

157. 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Moody v. Boston and Maine Co.158 In Nicholson, the plaintiff
alleged that the employer failed to provide a lavatory; employee
was injured by a suitcase while looking for a lavatory in a
passenger car. 159 The court applied Rogers and affirmed the lower
court's dismissal for lack of causation.160 In Moody, an employee
suffered a stress-related heart attack after his employer forced
him to work more than twelve hours with inadequate breaks.161
The trial court granted summary judgment finding no causation
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Rogers,
affirmed.162 By citing two cases that limited liability based
essentially on the fact that the injury was not within the scope of
the risk63 of the negligent act, Justice Ginsburg apparently
viewed the Rogers standard as sufficient to deal with such
bizarre cases to limit liability, i.e., she recognized the defendant
was only liable for those injuries which were within the scope of
the risk. I will analyze this aspect of the opinion further below.
Concluding, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Juries in . . . [FELA] cases are properly instructed that a
defendant railroad "caused or contributed to" a railroad
worker's injury "if [the railroad's] negligence played a part-no
matter how small-in bringing about the injury." That, indeed,
is the test Congress prescribed for proximate causation in
164
FELA cases.

The reader will once again note the use of "no matter how
small," rather than Rogers "even the slightest" language.
Notably, there is absolutely no reference to "proximate case."
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Alito, dissented.165 The Chief contended that the Court erred
in not requiring a plaintiff in an FELA case to prove proximate

158.
159.
160.
161.

921 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
Nicholson, 253 F.2d at 939.
Id. at 941.
Moody, 921 F.2d at 1.

162. Id. at 4.
163. In days of old, a court would have said there was no liability because
the plaintiff had not established that the defendant was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.

164. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011).
165. Id. at 705 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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cause. 16 6 To him, the majority only required cause-in-fact (but
for), but proximate cause was a requisite element in any
negligence case at common law, which should guide the Court in
its development of FELA (and Jones Act) jurisprudence. While
the Chief admitted there were criticisms of the various
formulations of the idea of proximate cause, he wrote "it is often
easier to disparage the product of centuries of common law than
to devise a plausible substitute."167 He said that the FELA
expressly abrogated common law limitations on recovery in four
ways-eliminating the bar of contributory negligence, abrogating
the fellow servant doctrine, eliminating the defense of
assumption of the risk, and rendering written waivers of liability
unenforceable-but Congress did not expressly eliminate the
need for a plaintiff to prove proximate cause. 16 8 The Chief read
the "whole or in part" language as a cross reference to the FELA's
creation of a comparative fault regime, not as an elimination of
the proximate cause requirement.169
If there is no need to prove proximate cause in FELA cases,
the Chief Justice Roberts opined that defendants would be held
liable for injuries that were not probable or foreseeable.170
Without a proximate cause requirement, all the majority was
requiring was "but for" causation.171 Counsel for McBride had
argued for "but for plus a relaxed form of legal cause."172 The
majority test, per Chief Justice Roberts, had no "plus."173 Chief
to review pre-Rogers FELA
Roberts proceeded
Justice
jurisprudence and scholarship requiring proximate cause, and
then turned to Rogers itself which he read as rejecting sole cause
analysis as well as emphasizing that the FELA created a
comparative fault regime where a plaintiff, who was just as much
to blame for an accident as a defendant, still recovered, albeit a

166. Id. at 706.
167. Id. at 707.
168. Id. at 708.

169. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 709-10 (2011).
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id.

275

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 15

reduced award.174 He wrote: "we have never held-until todaythat FELA entirely eliminates proximate cause as a limit on
liability."175
Chief Justice Roberts did not see the majority's statement
that the jury could consider foreseeability of the risk at the
breach stage as a cure for its elimination of proximate cause
because that would not eliminate liability where the risk of
injury was foreseeable, but the injury was not "directly" caused
by the defendant's negligence.176 Chief Justice Roberts also took
the majority to task for using different verbal formulations of its
causation test:
The Court's opinion fails to settle on a single test for answering
these questions: Is it that the railroad's negligence "pla[y] a
part-no matter how small-in bringing about the [plaintiff's]
injury," as the Court indicates . . . or that "negligence play any
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury[.]" . . . The
Court says there is no difference . . . but I suspect lawyers
litigating FELA cases will prefer one instruction over the
other, depending on whether they represent the employer or
the employee. 177

The Chief reiterated his call for the incorporation
proximate cause as an element in an FELA case:
Proximate cause . . . is useful to ask whether the injury that
resulted was within the scope of the risk created by the
defendant's negligent act; whether the injury was a natural or
probable consequence of the negligence; whether there was a
superseding or intervening cause; whether the negligence was
anything more than an antecedent event without which the
harm would not have occurred . . . law has its limits. But no
longer when it comes to the causal connection between
negligence and a resulting injury covered by FELA. A new
maxim has replaced the old: Caelum terminus est-the sky's
the limit.1 78

174. Id. at 711-13.
175. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 715 (2011).
176. Id. at 717.

177. Id. at 718-19.
178. Id. at 719-20.
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To sum up, Chief Justice Roberts essentially called for a
traditional proximate cause requirement and test.

VIII.

THE COMMENTATORS REACTION

Commentators responded to McBride. In The Federal
Employers Liability Act: Sense and Nonsense About Causation,179
Professor Michael D. Green,
reviewed the pre-McBride
jurisprudence and the confusion which ensued.180 He adopted a
somewhat wistful tone in noting that McBride did not clear up
the confusion. He lamented that the majority did not analytically
separate factual cause (cause-in-fact, or but for causation) from
the scope of risk or liability (i.e., the dated common law's
proximate cause).181 He opined that the Rogers "in whole or in
part" language may have some relevance where the evidence of
factual causation was uncertain.182 Optimistically, he said that
the Court had attempted to jettison the mumbo jumbo magic
words of proximate cause. 183 He also pointed out that the Court
did include a scope of liability limitation but that it was not
artfully worded, i.e., juries and judge could use their common
sense to deal with "far out" but for cases to limit liability (and
also to allow a judge to take a case form a jury).184
The late Professor David W. Robertson in CausationIssues in
FELA and Jones Act Cases in the Wake of McBride185 also found
the decision and opinions in McBride less than satisfying. In
vintage, clear Robertson style, he listed the theoretical
possibilities for what the post-McBride standard of causation

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Green, supra note 41.
See id.
Id. at 538-40.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 541.

185. David W. Robertson, CausationIssues in FELA and JonesAct Cases in
the Wake of McBride, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J. 397 (2012); see also David W. Robertson
& Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law
and the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J.
425, 432-33 (2012); Michael J. Daly et al., Recent Developments in Admiralty
and MaritimeLaw. 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 135. 136-37 (2011).
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actually might be and came up with six possibilities.186 He
concluded that the most likely reading of the holding was that
the "FELA lacks a formal fourth [proximate/legal cause/ scope of
liability] requirement, but courts can find a way within the
Rogers language to rule as a matter of law for defendants in
cases of extremely and inappropriately remote causation."187 He
expanded later:
Not only must trial judges avoid telling juries

anything

suggestive of traditional common law proximate cause, they

186. The six possibilities were:
#1. FELA is a four-element tort, not the usual five. The traditional
fourth requirement-proximate cause-has been entirely excised from
the Act.
#2. FELA lacks a formal fourth requirement, but the Rogers jury
instruction-that causation is satisfied if the railroad's negligence
played any part (even the slightest, no matter how small, etc.) in
bringing about the accident or illness-will, when subjected to the
common sense of jurors (who are, after all, generally instructed to
apply common sense), lead juries to weed out cases of extremely and
inappropriately remote causation.
#3. FELA lacks a formal fourth requirement, but courts can find a
way within the Rogers language to rule as a matter of law for
defendants in cases of extremely and inappropriately remote
causation.
#4. Like common law Negligence, the FELA Negligence cause of
action is a five-element tort. FELA's fourth requirement is not
traditional common law proximate cause. But, like traditional
common law proximate cause, this requirement does permit courts to
rule as a matter of law that the accident or illness of which the
plaintiff complains bears a too-attenuated connection with the
defendant's tortious conduct. This doctrine, which needs a different
name from proximate cause-perhaps "producing cause," or "legal
cause," or "scope of liability"-might take its content from:
(a) The "risk within array" approach of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, or
(b) The "refocused breach" variant of the Restatement (Third)'s
risk-within-array approach.
#5. FELA harbors the Souter/Sorrell version of proximate cause.
#6. FELA harbors a full-blown, old-fashioned common law proximate
cause requirement.
Robertson, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J., supranote 185, at 411-12.
187. Id. at 411.
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must themselves also eschew resorting to proximate cause
concepts for making matter-of-law determinations in FELA
cases. Nevertheless, the McBride Court indicated that trial
judges are enabled to rule as a matter of law for FELA
defendants whose negligence has brought about injuries to
workers in ways that are too "absurd or untoward" for liability
to be appropriate. In other words, it turns out that counsel for
McBride was correct in substance when he told the Court at
oral argument that "the correct standard for recovery under
FELA is "but-for plus a relaxed form of legal cause."188

Courts would be left to wrestle with the confusion and find no
liability when, based on the language in Rogers and McBride,
there is "but for" causation but, "there is no connection of any
kind between the accident or illness and those features of the
situation that made the defendant's conduct negligent."189 That
is, juries and judges could still find that some risks which a
defendant factually caused were not within the scope of the risks
which made the defendant's conduct negligent (a breach of the
appropriate standard of care).
Another commentator, John E. Holloway, referred to Justice
Ginsburg's appeal to common sense to limit liability in cases of
far out but-for causation as judicial activism.190 Two others
lamented the Court's failure to impose a proximate case or scope
of liability requirement in FELA and Jones Act cases and
proposed legislative responses. 191 Both expressed concern that
the McBride decision would or could lead to unlimited liability.
Another student commentator was also concerned about
unlimited liability, was wary of the Court's "common sense"
approach to causation, and proposed reliance on coincidental
causation cases as a potential limiting principle.192 As the author

188. Id. at 417-18.
189. Id. at 420.

190. John E. Holloway, JudicialActivism in Admiralty Cases, 43 TuL. MAR.
L.J. 21, 43-48 (2018).
191. Aaron Maples, Comment, Muddy Waters: The End of Proximate Cause

in FELA and Jones Act Cases, 10 Loy. MAR. L. J. 399 (2012); Trent R. Byquist,
Comment, Derailing FELA's Causation Standard: The Supreme Court's
Misinterpretationof FELA in McBride and Suggestions to Restrict the Potential
for Unlimited CarrierLiability, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 559 (2012).
192. Brett R. Noble, Comment, Are Railroads Liable When Lightning
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noted coincidental causation occurs in cases where the injury and
the breach of the standard of care are coincidental.193 An
automobile driver may have been speeding and that is what put
her at the place of the accident when it occurred (rather than at
some point upstream-earlier on her route-from the accident) so
the speeding was a "butfor" cause of the accident.194 They would
not have been where they were when the accident occurred but
for their speeding.195 However, the negligence (speeding) did not
increase the chance of the accident occurring.196 That is,
recurrence of the negligent behavior would not increase the risk
of the injury. Another way to say this may be that the risk which
occurred was not within the scope of liability associated with the
negligent act. Be that as it may, courts have not expressly
adopted the coincidental causation approach to the FELA/Jones
Act causation definition.

IX.

A SAMPLING OF POST-MCBRIDE JURISPRUDENCE

What have courts done since McBride? I have no intention of
being encyclopedic in this section but rather to sample a few
decisions. In Huffman v. Union Pacific R.R.197 the court reversed
a jury verdict for the plaintiff because it concluded that "there
was no expert testimony to support a link between Huffman's
performance of his work duties in less than ergonomically
optimal ways-a result of the railroad's negligence-and the
specific knee problem he suffer[ed], which is osteoarthritis."198 In
Huckaba v. CSX Transportation,Inc.,199 the court said that the
burden of proof on causation in FELA cases is lighter, but it read
McBride as requiring more proof of causation than "but for."200
The court pointed to Justice Ginsburg's citations of Nicholson

Strikes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1538 (2012).
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 1539.
Id.
Id. at 1540.

197. 675 F.3d 412, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2012).

198. Id.
199. No. 13-cv- 0586-MJR-PMF, 2014 WL 12139085, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 28,
2014).
200. Id.
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and Moody, infra.201 In Huckaba, the plaintiff alleged that he
injured himself lifting a generator which was necessitated
because his employer did not have enough batteries on hand, i.e.,
if there had been more charged batteries available the generator
would not have been needed.202 The court granted summary
judgment and dismissed that claim.203
In Gaston v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,204 the court did not read
McBride as totally eliminating a proximate cause requirement
but as recognizing a relaxed causation standard.205 The court
there cited to and quoted from Justice Ginsburg's opinion and
said "[o]nly when 'common sense' dictates that a 'but-for' scenario
is too attenuated or 'far out' should a district court not send a
claim to the jury."206 Other courts have effectively concluded that
there is no proximate cause limitation in FELA and Jones Act
cases. 207 In Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., the court noted that "but
for" causation was required (and lacking).208

X.

AND SO?

Thus, courts continue to speak in a bit of an analytical haze,
not unlike the post-Rogerslpre-McBride jurisprudence, even if

201. Id.
202. Id. at *4.
a. 203. Id. at *6 (The court did not dismiss various other claims and the
plaintiffs ultimately prevailed.); see Niederhofer v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., No. 5-10-

0392, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 2644 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2011) (interpreting
McBride as requiring more than "but for" causation).

204. No. 2:17-CV-1151, 2020 WL 5593262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2020).
205. Id. at *11.

206. Id.; see also Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1153, 2012 WL
13026806, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 12, 2012).
207. Wardwell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 88 N.E. 3d 772, 776 (Ill. 2017)
(Interestingly, the decision allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff was
the "sole" negligent party who caused his injury); see also Mickey v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 358 S.W. 3d 138, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (Not an error to refuse to instruct
that plaintiff must establish defendant was a proximate cause of his injuries).

208. Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 536 F. App'x. 717 (6th Cir. 2013). Courts
have also discussed the precise language of an FELA instruction after McBride.

For instance, in Cooke

v. CSX Transp., Inc., 408 S.W. 3d 752, 757 (Ky. 2012),

the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a jury instruction need not include "no
matter how slight" where it included the "in whole or in part language." It
would be fair to say that some confusion continues.
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they achieve sensible results. Uniformity of approach and
analysis are clearly absent. That said, despite the analytical
confusion, the sky has not fallen. There has not been unlimited,
injury-crippling, commercial gears halting liability. And that is to
be expected because the universe of claims-from interstate and
international railroad workers and seamen-is not large. But
even in the limited universe of the claims at issue, liability has
not been staggering, and while my review has not been
exhaustive, there are not many cases that even cause the reader
concern about unlimited liability to be concerned. No courts have
imposed liability when lightning strikes.
Perhaps there is a message there. Maybe proximate cause is
just not worth the effort-anywhere at all. Maybe juries and
judges simply deciding breach, cause, and damages get it right
without worrying about the proximate cause mumbo jumbo of the
common law and its litany of supposed tests: foreseeable,
unforeseeable, foresight, hindsight, direct, remote, natural and
probable, intervening, superseding, and on and on and on.
Perhaps, going further, courts and jurors do not really need to
worry about scope of risk or scope of liability at all. It will work
out. I confess life would be simpler and there is an appeal to
finally just punting. But doing so would be a radical departure
from the common law, even the common law of today, and would
increase the risk of outlier results in bizarre cases. In American
law, the notion that there is a scope of risk limitation on liability
is universal and the Court's failure to expressly state it in FELA
and Jones Act cases stands in stark contrast to mainstream law.
While I prefer not to call it "proximate cause," as Chief Justice
Roberts did in McBride, he is right that that requiring more than
"but for" causation-what we may call scope of risk-in negligent
cases is a vital component of Twenty-first Century negligence
law.209 Consequently, I venture a few additional observations and
a modest proposal.
First, I offer a historical note on causation. The FELA,
passed in 1908, provides that a railroad is liable when its
negligence causes "in whole or in part," an employee's injury or

209. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 706-07 (2011) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
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death.210 The FELA, and hence the Jones Act, do not expressly
separate cause-in-fact from proximate/legal cause or scope of the
risk. But it is also true that common law courts themselves often
spoke of causation without bisecting the inquiry.211 Indeed,
Justice Andrews in his famous dissent in Palsgrafv. Long Island
R.R. Co., which Justice Ginsburg cited in Sorrell and McBride,
includes cause-in-fact as a part of proximate cause. 212
Congress enacted the FELA during the time when the single
causation analysis practice was not uncommon. One of the great
contributions of the legal realists, people like Leon Green and
Wex Malone, was to clearly separate the cause-in-fact question
from the scope of liability question. Thus, simply because the
FELA does not expressly call for a proximate cause or scope of
liability analysis does not mean it should not be an element of a
modern negligence action. The FELA and Jones Act are products
of their times and the times have changed as has the common
law. I will return to this point in a moment.
Second, another target of the realists was sole cause
language and sole cause conclusions. Rogers rejection of sole
causation language was consistent with modern terminology and
remains so. 2 1 3 It is not helpful or accurate to speak of a sole
cause. Everything in life, including accidents and injuries, has an
infinite number of causes stretching back to Eden or the Big
Bang-depending upon your beliefs. Moreover, sole cause
language reared and continues to rear its head in cases, like
Rogers, where the alleged sole cause of the injury is the plaintiff's
negligence.214 That means sole cause conclusions tend to
undermine and even conflict with comparative fault. Happily,
McBride keeps sole cause language appropriately buried.215

210. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2020).
211. Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 778.

212. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 354 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) ("The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many other
causes, must be, at the least, something without which the event would not
happen.").

213. Cf. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996).
214. See, e.g., id. (General maritime law tort case, not a Jones Act case).
215. But see Wardwell, 88 N.E. 3d at 772. (Interestingly, the decision
allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff was the "sole" negligent party
who caused his injury).
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Third, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in McBride,216 like her
concurrence in Sorrell,217 urges courts to abandon the words
"proximate cause." Doing so is a fabulous, if belated, tribute to
Leon Green and it is a blessing for judges, lawyers, and law
students. The phrase and its litany of ambiguous, befuddling, socalled tests befogged; they did not clarify. The Restatements used
the term "legal cause" instead of proximate cause. 218 That
substitution was not particularly helpful, even if slightly less
mis-titled than proximate cause. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 eschews those terms
entirely and provides that: "An actor's liability is limited to those
harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct
tortious."219 The Restatement (Third) tells it like it is-the
question is scope of the risk. Is the risk in this case one of the
risks which made what the defendant did a breach of the
appropriate standard of care? Happily, McBride does not take us
back into the misleading morass of proximate cause language.
Justice Ginsburg is right on this point. The dissenters are wrong.
But, while McBride is post-modern in taking tort law away
from proximate or legal cause terminology, it is not so up-to-date
when it continues the FELA and Rogers tendency to merge
cause-in-fact and scope of risk or scope of liability. Justice
Ginsburg wrote that the FELA in requiring causation in whole or
in part expresses the FELA (and Jones Act) test for proximate
cause. 220 But she did not carefully state-and no U.S. Supreme
Court decision since Rogers has-that the causation inquiry
involves two distinct elements: cause-in-fact and some limitation
on the scope of risk or liability. She clearly contemplated causein-fact when she talked about common sense limiting far out but
for causes but did not expressly state that cause-in-fact and legal
limitation or scope of liability were separate inquiries. That is the
common law of the Twenty-first Century and the Court, in

216. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011).
217. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 180 (2007).
218. Restatement (First) of Torts § 9; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 9
(Am. Law Inst. 1965).
219. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harms § 29 (Am. Law
Inst. 2010).
220. McBride. 564 U.S. at 705.
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interpreting the FELA and the Jones Act should be guided by the
common law.221 Instead of separating cause-in-fact and scope of
the risk, Justice Ginsburg keeps them conflated, stating that
"[p]roperly instructed on negligence and causation" and told to
use their "common sense" jurors can deal with far out but for
cases but that proper instruction on causation is the "in whole or
in part" causation instruction with no separation of case-in-fact
and scope of liability.222
Historically, and today, FELA and Jones Act cases that
involve cause-in-fact and those that involve scope of liability
analytically get mixed together. For instance, in Jones, which I
described at the start of this talk, the issue really was cause-infact. The plaintiff could not establish that the defendant's having
allowed grease to occasionally collect on deck had caused him to
fall.223 It was impossible to say that but for the grease, the
plaintiff would not have fallen because the plaintiff could not
show any grease on his pants, on his shoes, or in the area where
he fell. Likewise, Huffman v. Union Pacific Railroad224 was a
cause-in-fact case. The plaintiff could not establish that his
osteoarthritis was caused by cumulative trauma from the
demands of his job.225 He could not show that but for the work
trauma, he would not have had the condition.226 Moreover,
Gallick was a cause-in-fact case. 227 Did the bug that bit the
plaintiff come from the defendant's fetid pool or from somewhere
else?228 In none of these cases, do the courts specifically speak to
and analyze cause-in-fact. They discuss causation generally. That
confuses the law and is a throwback to when cause-in-fact and
scope of liability were a unified concept or element in negligence
cases.
Analyzing cause-in-fact as a separate element would
encourage consideration of a very important question. Is the

221.
222.
223.
224.

See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
McBride, 564 U.S. at 705.
Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2019).
675 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2012).

225. Id. at 426.
226. Id.

227. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 113 (1963).
228. Id.
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standard for cause-in-fact relaxed in an FELA/Jones Act case?
Should it be? Should it be lower than at common law? Even
though the FELA and the Jones Act are not workers'
compensation statutes, should a relaxed burden of factual cause
apply as it does in many workers' compensation regimes?229 The
Court has not considered this question, in part, perhaps, because
it has been mired in the single "causation" swamp. A relaxed
standard on cause-in-fact might mean that the plaintiff need not
establish cause-in-fact as a probability but perhaps only as a
possibility. And under that standard Huffman may have been
able to establish cause-in-fact. Indeed, Gallick's "something to do
with" phrase seems like a relaxed cause-in-fact requirement.230
Moving on, while some may opine that McBride totally
eliminated the proximate cause or scope of liability requirement
entirely, it clearly did not do so. 231 Justice Ginsburg, as noted,
stated that factfinders when "properly instructed" and told to use
their "common sense" would not award damages in "far out" but
for scenarios.232 She continued: "Indeed, judges would have no
warrant to submit such cases to the jury."233 As I said above, she
approvingly cited two cases for her common sense proposition:
Nicholson v. Erie R. Co.234 and Moody v. Boston and Maine Co.235
In Nicholson, a female railroad worker worked in the shops
where there was no restroom for women. 236 Thus, when the
plaintiff had to go to the bathroom, she had to walk to one of the
cars standing on adjacent tracks.237 During a trip to a restroom in
a railroad car, plaintiff was injured by a passenger's suitcase.238
Even though there was cause-in-fact, the court did not hold the
railroad liable.239 Cause and effect were according to the court (in
229. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dillard's Dep't Store, 759 So. 2d 1074 (La. Ct. 2d
Cir. 2000).
230. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 113.
231. McBride, 564 U.S. at 704.
232. Id.
233. Id.

234. 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958).
235. 921 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
236. Nicholson, 253 F.2d at 940.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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proximate cause parlance) too far removed to justify liability.240
In Moody, a railroad worker's widow sued her late husband's
employer, claiming that his fatal heart attack was the result of
the long hours he had worked and interruptions to his rest when
off-duty because of schedule shifts.241 The trial court granted
summary judgment because it was not foreseeable (proximate
cause, not breach, parlance) that the worker would suffer a heart
attack from stress of which the railroad was never informed.242
Both courts employed proximate cause terminology and
reasoning to limit liability and Justice Ginsburg cited them
approvingly.
In both, "but for" causation was arguably
established but there was no liability.243 The two cited decisions
stand for the proposition that even under the Justice Ginsburg
analysis, there is some limitation on liability in FELA negligence
cases. But the problem under Justice Ginsburg's common-sense
rule remains: what is the standard and what is the content of a
proper jury instruction on scope of liability and what is the
concomitant legal standard a court should use when deciding
whether to send the case to the jury. It is not foreseeability244 or

240. Id.

241. Moody, 921 F.2d at 2.
242. Id. at 5.
243. For instance, in Nicholson, if there had been a woman's restroom in the
shops the plaintiff would not have had to look for one elsewhere. But for the
failure to provide the restroom, plaintiff would not have suffered injury from a
passenger's luggage in a train car looking for a woman's restroom. And in
Moody, while cause-in-fact is not as clear it seems the court merely accepted the
possibility that but for the extra work the heart attack would not have occurred
but there was no liability because the heart attack was not foreseeable.
244. Chief Justice Roberts was correct in saying that merely because
foreseeability is relevant to determining breach does not solve the problem of
unlimited liability. For instance, in McBride, it was a breach of the duty to
exercise reasonable care to provide safe equipment and instructions how to use
that equipment. It is foreseeable that the failure to provide proper equipment
and instruction while switching railroad cars might result in personal injury.
But imagine that after injuring his wrist the plaintiff had gone off to his car to
go to the hospital, but his car did not start because the starter failed. Then
imagine a co-worker offered to give the plaintiff a ride in his car. The co-worker
providing the ride had COVID-19 but was asymptomatic. The plaintiff caught
COVID-19 and sued the employer for the COVID-19. A jury might properly find
that the employer was negligent-i.e., breached the duty to exercise reasonable
care-because the failure to provide proper equipment might foreseeably cause
injury to a worker. But contracting COVID-19 from a co-worker is not one of the
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remoteness, as she makes clear in her opinion, because those
ideas hearken back to proximate cause.
As noted, John Holloway was critical of the far out cause test,
but an instruction asking a juror to use their common sense in
determining scope of liability is infinitely superior to a jury
instruction that returns to the mumbo jumbo magic words of
proximate cause. 245 What more might the jury be told? As noted,
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physicaland Emotional Harm §
29 eschews those terms proximate and legal cause entirely and
provides that: "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that
result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious."246 I
have written elsewhere on the subject of scope of liability and
jury instructions on that issue. I said:
The court should ask the jury, when deciding scope of liability,
whether the general type of injury that the plaintiff suffered
was one of the harms risked when the defendant acted, and
acted negligently. That is, "Jurors, do you associate the type of
injury which plaintiff suffered with the risks defendant's
conduct posed?" I would add, but not insist upon, "In so
deciding you should rely upon your common sense, your
experience, and your sense of fairness." I believe the word
fairness, while not free of opacity, is much clearer to the
ordinary
person
than
foreseeability,
direct,
remote,
intervening, superseding, etc. It is, in essence, a command to
the fact finder to do the right thing in the case before the
court-and only that case. 247

In FELA/Jones Act cases, in recognition of the so-called
relaxed causation standard, I would suggest that the court might
add: In determining whether the injury was within the risks
defendant's conduct posed you should keep in mind that
Congress enacted this law [FELA/Jones Act] to provide protection
risks that made the failure to provide equipment negligent. Chief Justice
Roberts, to quote his dissent, might say the COVID-19 damages were not the
direct result of the breach. I would prefer to say that they were not within the
scope of risks which made the employer's act negligent.
245. John E. Holloway, JudicialActivism in Admiralty Cases, 43 TUL. MAR.

L.J. 21, 43-48 (2018).
246. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harms § 29 (Am. Law

Inst. 2010).
247. Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 830.
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and relief to injured workers.
It bears pointing out that even though Justice Ginsburg's
common-sense limitation on far out cases is not an expressly
proximate cause or scope of liability requirement, she did
contemplate that it is the jury that uses its common sense in
deciding whether the case is too far out. 24 8 Put in the terms I
would prefer; it is the jury which decides scope of risk or liability.
This is what the Restatement (Third) provides.249 Only if
reasonable minds could not disagree may the jury grant a
summary judgment on far-outness or scope of risk.

XII.

CONCLUSION

Thus, at the end of the day, there is still confusion and there
is also the somewhat unsettling decision in Kernan which
imposed liability in a violation of statute case even though the
risk which occurred was not one of the risks the statute was
enacted to protect against. That seems a clear refutation of any
proximate cause or limitation of liability prong in Jones Act
violation of statute cases. Interestingly, Kernan, like Rogers, is
an opinion on the appropriate limitation of liability25O by Justice
Brennan. Neither matches up very well with the traditional or
even modern structure of negligence. Kernan also seems
analytically inconsistent with McBride and its common-sense
limits on liability. Perhaps, Kernan can be read as standing for
the proposition that in FELA and Jones Act violation of statute
cases, courts should interpret the scope of targeted statutory
risks very broadly because of the FELA and Jones Act policies of
protecting and providing relief to injured railroad workers and
seamen. That is consistent with my proposed jury instruction
urging jurors in FELA and Jones Act cases to bear in mind the
pro-worker policies behind those two statutes. But to be
consistent, there must be some limit, albeit a rather distant

limit.
Plaintiffs may lament that I opine that there is some liability

248. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 700 (2011).
249. See, e.g., Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 829.
250. I use the phrase limitation of liability in a tort sense not an admiralty
sense.
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limiting device left in FELA/Jones Act cases, but they should not
be too quick to wish for the elimination of a scope of the risk
limitation on liability. Why? Sorrell. What is sauce 251 for the
goose on cause would be sauce for the gander on cause. Since
Sorrell held that the standard for proving causation for the
plaintiff is the same as the standard of causation for the
defendant alleging comparative fault, that would mean that if
the plaintiff only has to establish but for causation to establish
liability then the defendant only has to establish but for
causation to establish comparative fault. That is a bad thing for
injured workers.
Who will answer all the unanswered questions? Hopefully,
the United States Supreme Court-sometime soon. And when it
does, I would urge the Court to request an amicus brief from
some torts teachers.

251. The adage seems particularly appropriate because sauce and cause
have all the same letters and one of the two words turns into the other and back
again with the transposition of the letters s and c.
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